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1. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, Israel's financial system has
undergone significant changes. Although the desirability of
capital market reform is widely recognized, controversy
persists regarding the extent to which steps taken during the
second half of the 1980's adequately address the challenges
Israel is now facing.' Israel is confronted with the unprece-
dented socio-economic task of absorbing as many as one
million immigrants, many highly-trained professionals in the
fields of science and technology, from the republics which until
recently comprised the Soviet Union. In addition, the possibil-
ity of peace, or at least the cessation of periodic military
conflict in the Middle East, could provide an opportunity for
Israel to develop into a regional, and perhaps even an interna-
tional, financial center.
The structure of Israel's financial system reflects, inter
alia, a failure to resolve the conflict between two inherently
contradictory perceptions of the appropriate role of government
in the economy. The first calls for active government interven-
tion in the allocation of capital based on the principle of
centrally-directed economic development. The second empha-
sizes the need for "free market" allocation of resources
tempered only by limited government regulation based on the
principle of "full disclosure." Although significant steps have
been taken to securitize the public debt, broaden participation
in the market and enhance the integrity of market mecha-
nisms, the basic contradiction that underlies Israel's regulato-
ry philosophy remains unresolved.
*Albertson and Waltuch Professor of Finance, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Israel and Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies. The author
acknowledges the research assistance and helpful comments of June
Dilevsky.
' For a detailed discussion of capital market reform in Israel, see THE
FLOERSEIMER INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, CAPITAL MARKET REFORM
IN ISRAEL (Marshall Sarnat ed. 1991).
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This Article critically examines and evaluates the evolution
of public regulation in Israel, and its impact on the capital
market. It focuses on the scope and pace of legislative reform
and the regulatory role of government, both prior and subse-
quent to the policy changes that were initiated by the Trea-
sury, the Bank of Israel and the Securities Authority following
the crash of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in 1983. The failure
to reconcile the two diametrically opposing philosophies, more
than any other single factor, has shaped, and continues to
influence, capital market regulation in Israel. The conse-
quences of this unresolved conflict affect Israel's ability to
reach its domestic economic and political goals and to create
for itself an appropriate niche in the emerging global market
place.
2. THE MANDATE AND EARLY YEARS OF STATEHOOD
The emergence of a formal securities market in Israel is
relatively recent, and can be traced back to the first half of the
1930's, during the British Mandate. In the years 1933 through
1937, significant amounts of capital were raised for the first
time by public subscription in the domestic market. This
rather abrupt emergence of a new issues market for securities
reflected the transfer, by German Jewish immigrants, of their
capital resources to Palestine after Hitler's rise to power.2 To
expedite the transfer, many German Jews purchased securities
issued by local companies and institutions established
expressly for this purpose. However, the purchase of these
securities by these immigrants clearly had no economic
motivation in the narrow sense of the term. Confronted by the
great danger in waiting for a "cash transfer," they bought
these securities, which were substantially over-priced, at a
premium to expedite the capital transfer rather to make an
investment. Perhaps the closest analogy is provided by
compulsory loans demanded by governments in times of
economic crises.
2 See Marshall Sarnat, Note, The Emergence of Israel's Security Market,
J. ECON. HIsT. 693, 693 (1989); MARSHALL SARNAT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SECURITIES MARKET IN ISRAEL (1966).
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The Companies Ordinance of 1929' provided a regulatory
framework which governed the nascent securities market.
This Ordinance was, in essence, identical to legislation that
applied at the time throughout the British Empire. The
Companies Ordinance stipulated various disclosure require-
ments; however, it did not assign responsibility for such
regulation to any specific governmental department.4
The true emergence of the securities market in Palestine
should be dated from the closing years of World War II, during
which the country's leading industrial concerns tapped the
domestic market for funds, and the primary motivation for
investment and financing decisions was economic in nature.
World War II also marks a turning point in governmental
regulation. In 1941, an income tax was introduced, the
Banking Ordinance5 was revised, and the Defence (finance)
Regulations of 19416 were issued. The latter required govern-
mental approval of public security issues and also served as
the basis for foreign currency control until their repeal in
1978.
The requirement for governmental approval of new issues,
originally adopted by the Mandatory government as an
emergency war-time measure, was carried over in 1948 to the
new State of Israel. Subsequent approvals of securities issues
were based largely on macro-economic considerations and the
government's budgetary needs. Other aspects of raising
capital-registration, prospectuses, and disclosure-were dealt
with in The Israeli Companies Ordinance of 1929, which like
the Defence Regulations, Income Tax Ordinance, and Banking
Law were also incorporated by the new State.
In the mid-1950's, government intervention in the market
became even more pronounced. In 1955, the government
added regulations to the Insurance Business Control Bill of
' See The Israeli Companies Ordinance of 1929, LAWS OF PALESTINE:
ORDINANCES, vol. 1, chs. 1-66 (1933).
4 See JOSEPH GROSS, SECURITIES AND STOCK EXCHANGE LAW 20 (1973).
' See The Israeli Banking Ordinance of 1941 No. 1118, THE PALESTINE
GAZETTE 747, 750-59 (1941).
'See Defence (finance) Regulations of 1941 No. 1138, THE PALESTINE
GAZETTE 1635, 1647-59 (Supp. II 1941) [hereinafter Defence Regulations].
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1951,' requiring minimal levels of compulsory investment by
insurance firms in government or government-guaranteed
securities. The Encouragement of Savings Law of 1956
established tax ceilings on approved securities, and set out
restrictions on the investment policies of savings plans.' In
1957, the Treasury issued special income tax regulations
relating to the activities and investment policies of provident,
pension, severance pay and annual leave funds.9
The overall effect of these laws and regulations was to
greatly reduce the discretionary investment activities of
institutional investors. Government controls related to both
the supply and demand of funds. On the supply side, new
issues required government approval under the Defence
Regulations. On the demand side, institutional investors were
required to invest significant percentages of their capital in
"approved" securities. These restrictions came at a time, when
due to high inflation and the subsequent introduction of
indexation on a broad scale, security issues by the private
sector were all but non-existent.
The early years of statehood were marked by an unprece-
dented volume of immigration, an inflationary spiral, and a
more than five-fold devaluation of the external value of the
currency. Both the bond and equity markets were unable to
cope with the unstable economic environment, and the total
amount of capital raised in the domestic market was grossly
inadequate to finance the massive waves of immigration.
Israel did not have a separate securities law; legal matters
pertaining to such things as the Stock Exchange, securities
transactions, new issues, and corporate reporting were dealt
with in existing economic legislation carried over from the
British Mandate. 10
In the latter part of the 1950's, two advisory committees
were set up in the Ministry of Finance for the supervision and
' See Regulations to the Insurance Business Control Bill of 1951, 490
KovETz HATAKANOT 258 (1954).
s See Encouragement of Savings Law of 1956, 10 LAws OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 49-67 (1955-56).
" Rules for the Approval of Provident, Pension and Severance Pay Funds
of 1957, 726 KOvETz HATAKANOT 1826-31 (1956-57).
" See Haim Ben-Shahar, Saul Bronfeld & Alexander Cukierman, The
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evaluation of new issues. The New Issues Committee was
comprised of representatives of the Treasury, Bank of Israel
and the Investment Center (another governmental depart-
ment). Its task was to review new issues within the frame-
work of the Ministry's authority under the Defence Regula-
tions. More specifically, the New Issues Committee was
responsible for evaluating new issues in terms of their impact
on the Israeli economy and economic policy. The second
committee, the Securities Committee, included representatives
from the Treasury, Bank of Israel, and Ministry of Industry
and Trade, as well as the banking community, corporations,
and the public. The Securities Committee was assigned the
task of checking prospectuses. The scope of the two committ-
ees' activities can be inferred from the fact that they were both
serviced by an office within the Ministry of Finance which
employed only one lawyer and one accountant at the time."
3. THE SECURITIES LAW
A new issue of common stock by the American-Israel Paper
Mills in 1959 signaled a dramatic revival of the stock market.
Between 1959 and 1964, 118 new issues of common stock were
floated in the domestic market. 2 The expansion of the stock
market, accompanied by an unprecedented rise in share prices
and trading volume, focused attention on the need for a more
formal definition in law of the role of the securities market. In
1961, the Joint Investments Trust Law was enacted.'3 This
law, regulating the investment activities of mutual funds,
stipulated that the mutual fund managers invest in securities
listed on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.'4 It also established
ceilings on the amount an individual fund could hold in a
given company's securities and prohibited the issue of closed-
end investment funds.
In 1962, the Ministry of Finance appointed the Commission
on New Issues and Trading (the "Yadin Commission") to
n See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR NEW ISSUES AND TRADING 5
(June 1963).
12 SARNAT, supra note 2, at 47.
"s See Joint Investments Trust Law of 1961, 15 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 79-89 (1960-61).
14 d. at 79, 83.
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examine the legal and administrative foundations of both the
primary and secondary markets. The Yadin Commission also
explored alternative arrangements for the regulation of
security market activities "with a view to protecting the
interest of investors in shares and other securities."15 The
Yadin Commission heard testimony from experts from the
United States including Professor Louis Loss and former
Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Manuel Cohen.
The Yadin Commission's report, which was presented to the
Minister of Finance in June 1963, emphasized the need to
create public confidence in Israel's securities market. Manuel
Cohen summarized the Yadin Commission's goals as follows:
[W]hile there are no serious abuses as yet, it is better
to have the law and anticipate the abuses .... Israel
has a problem in the fact that its population consists of
people from all over the world. You are trying to
marshall their savings and encourage investment in
securities, a concept which many of them do not under-
stand and, because they do not understand, suspicion
exists. To the extent that you are in a position to tell
the public that you have erected a structure and
adopted a law designed for their protection, you will
have a better chance of encouraging local investment.
Finally, Israel is interested in encouraging portfolio
investment from abroad. In the U.S. and England you
will instill confidence if people know that you have
erected a structure of control which provides a real
measure of protection.'"
The Yadin Commission's principal recommendations
included:
a. Adoption of the American version of full disclosure as
the underlying philosophy for securities regulation.
b. Establishment of a Securities Authority to supervise
activities in the primary and secondary markets.
c. Establishment of the new Securities Authority as a
separate regulatory agency.
11 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON NEW ISSUES AND TRADING, supra note
11, at 1.
" Id. at 4.
[Vol. 13:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss3/2
CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION IN ISRAEL
d. Retention of the status of the Stock Exchange as a self-
regulating body, subject to public review. 7
The Yadin Commission's report also included draft legislation
which became the basis of the 1968 Securities Law.18
The Securities Law embraced the U.S. philosophy of
securities legislation: full disclosure of, and equal access to,
all material information, and the legal accountability of all
participants involved in the investment process.' The
philosophy of "full disclosure" was adopted as it endeavored to
protect the investors' interests while enhancing market
efficiency. The philosophy is based on the notion that timely
disclosure of all material information is the mechanism by
which these goals are to be achieved. Theoretically, other
impediments were to be kept at the minimum necessary to
ensure the operations of a free market. Thus, the new ap-
proach embracing "full disclosure" eschewed, as a matter of
principle, direct governmental intervention where the primary
focus of securities regulation was placed on the quality and
frequency of information and on the integrity of the institu-
tions and personnel involved in the primary and secondary
markets.
Israel's 1968 Securities Law and subsequent secondary
legislation radically differed from the interventionist approach
that pervaded the previous legislation and administrative
arrangements. But instead of replacing traditional regulatory
thinking, "full disclosure" was superimposed on an "adminis-
tered" market. Section 8 of the Defence Regulations, which
required government approval for securities issues, remained
in force and was later incorporated as an amendment to
section 39 of the Securities Law. Moreover, the system by
which the government controlled both the supply and demand
for capital persisted.
Thus, Israel's new securities law did not come to grips with
the fundamental paradox inherent in basing regulation partly
on the Anglo-American philosophy of free market allocation
and partly on the "socialist" or "paternalistic" principle of
17 id.
"8 See Securities Law, 22 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 266-81 (1967-
68).
"$ See LouIs LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 121-28 (2d ed. 1961).
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administered markets. The 1968 law charged the newly
created Securities Authority with the protection of investors'
interests, based on full disclosure and directed that the
Ministry of Finance handle those activities involving the
channelling of capital. This separation of functions reflected
the underlying philosophy of the Yadin Commission: "Despite
the fact that all agencies are working within the same general
governmental framework, separation is desirable to reflect the
various aims of each body. It is unhealthy that differing
considerations be intertwined."20
With this view in mind, the Securities Authority was
established as a separate statutory body subject to review by
the State Comptroller, and was provided with broad powers to
protect the interests of investors in both the primary and
secondary markets. The new Authority had the potential to
become a major factor in Israel's capital market, but the
Authority did not live up to this potential. Throughout the
1970's and the first half of the 1980's the Securities Authority
played a marginal role in the development of Israel's emerging
market. It tended to take a technocratic stance with regard to
full disclosure. If a prospectus included the technical account-
ing details specified in the Securities Regulations, it was
usually approved without significant debate. Little attention
was given to the quality of information disclosed in the
prospectus as a whole. Even less attention was given to
material omissions from the prospectus and periodic financial
reports.2
In a report following the bank share crisis, the State
Comptroller cited the failure of the Securities Authority to
fulfill its functions with regard to the banks' intervention in
the trading of their stock." In 1986, a judicial commission
of enquiry (the "Commission of Enquiry") concluded that the
Securities Authority had failed in all of the areas in which it
was empowered by law to operate. The Commission of
2 See Uriel Yadin, The Yadin Commission-It's Operations and
Conclusions, in THE YADIN COMMISSION ON THE SECURITIES MARKET IN
ISRAEL: A COLLECTION OF LECTURES 13 (1964).
2 1 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE INTERVENTION
IN THE TRADING OF BANK SHARES, ch. 20 (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter COMMIS-
SION OF ENQUIRY REPORT].
22 See ISRAEL STATE COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE, REPORT ON THE BANK
SHARES: THE OCTOBER 1983 CRISIS 12 (1984).
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Enquiry found that: "[t]he Authority, which was established
to protect the public, surrendered, without opposition, to the
demands of both internal and external pressure groups. As a
result, the public was left defenseless."3
With the exception of Amendment 6 to the Securities Law,
which placed specific prohibitions on the abuse of insider
information," few substantive changes were made to the Law
itself. Secondary legislation concentrated primarily on
technical accounting issues, while some of the major legal
issues of the Securities Law such as government manipulation
of the market, due diligence and accountability were left
untouched. The number of civil and criminal court cases
dealing with securities violations were few, and even today
there is a paucity of judicial decisions that can serve as an
accepted basis for interpreting many facets of the law.
The excessive volatility generated by periodic "booms and
busts" on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange during the late 1970's
and early 1980's, spawned numerous public committees and
commissions. More often than not, they tended to come down
on the side of the status quo." The fundamental contradic-
tion between two competing philosophies of regulation-
substantive government control of new securities issues versus
a free market philosophy tempered only by limited government
interference based on the principles of full disclosure-
remained unresolved.
4. THE 1983 BANK SHARE CRISIS
Like those of many European and developing countries,
Israel's financial markets are dominated by commercial banks
operating under a system of universal banking which does not
separate commercial from investment banking activities. The
historical development of the country's banks created a highly
centralized structure in which a small number of banking
institutions dominate both commercial banking and the capital
markets. The commercial banks and their subsidiaries
23 See COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY REPORT, supra note 20, at 319.
24 See Securities Law, 35 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 319-29 (1968),
amended by ch. 8A, §§ 52a-j (1981).
" For a detailed description of the various public commissions, see
Marshall Sarnat & June Dilevsky, The Development of Capital Market
Regulation in Israel, Q. BANKING REV., Dec. 1991, at 11.
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dominate the mortgage, insurance, securities brokerage, and
underwriting markets as well as the management of mutual
investment funds and retirement funds.
Starting in the early 1970's, Israel's leading commercial
banks, followed later by several smaller banks, began to
systematically support the prices of their own shares on the
stock exchange.2" In the summer of 1983, expectations of a
major devaluation motivated investors to sell their bank
shares on the Exchange in favor of dollar-linked assets. The
banks soon found themselves saddled with over $900 million
worth of repurchased shares,"' but without the financial
means to continue their policy of price support. To avert a
collapse of bank share prices, the government intervened and
initiated an "arrangement" under which the bank shares were,
in effect, converted into government bonds.
In many ways 1983 signifies for Israel what the year 1929
represents for the United States. As a result of two successive
stock exchange crashes, first in the market for non-bank
shares and later in the year in the market for bank shares,
stock prices fell on average by 70 percent (in dollar terms) and
the ownership (but not control) of the banking system was
transferred to the government. In 1984, the State Comptroller
issued a report on the bank share crisis that engendered a
heated public debate which culminated in the appointment, in
January 1985, of a judicial commission of enquiry.
5. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOLLOWING
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
1983 also marks a watershed in the evolution of regulatory
thinking and practice in Israel. The financial crisis and the
publication of the Commission of Enquiry's report accelerated
the pace of capital market reform. Between 1984 and 1986,
various regulatory agencies and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
20 See COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY REPORT, supra note 20 (description of the
events leading to the bank share crisis).
2 The Israeli Companies Ordinance of 1929, supra note 3, art. 98
(current version at art. 139 (1983)) forbids the repurchase of shares by the
issuing firm. The commercial banks circumvented this restriction by
repurchasing shares through subsidiaries, some of which were established




CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION IN ISRAEL
introduced a series of administrative changes.
The Stock Exchange established disclosure requirements
regarding insider trading, set up standards for price stabiliza-
tion practices, adopted rules governing portfolio management
by members, issued directives prohibiting listed firms from
paying "management fees" to major stockholders, and required
Exchange approval of all tender offers.2"
The Bank of Israel placed limits on the underwriting
activities of commercial banks and issued directives concerning
the investment advice offered by the banks to their custom-
ers."9 The new regulations stipulated that bank-employed
investment advisors must reveal all pertinent information
regarding the recommended investment advisor, particularly
with respect to high-risk investments. In addition, the Central
Bank's direct intervention in the open market for medium and
long-term government securities was drastically reduced.
Monetary policy was also liberalized and initial steps were
taken to reduce foreign currency restrictions.
In the spring of 1987, the Treasury suspended the require-
ment of prior approval for individual bond issues by granting
a "general permit" for (non-bank) corporate stock and bond
issues. The tax status of corporate bonds was changed to put
them on equal footing with government issues.so At the same
time, the Treasury embarked on a policy to "securitize" the
national debt and relax, but not relinquish, controls over the
investment policies of major institutional investors.
For its part, the Securities Authority issued new regula-
tions requiring the immediate disclosure of significant
corporate events including in-process negotiations and more
specific disclosure of the intended uses of offering proceeds."1
18 See generally THE TEL AVIv STOCK EXCHANGE, MONTHLY REV.
, Rules of Banking (Investment Advisors), Regulations Under the
Banking (Service to Customer) Law of 1986, 4931 KOVETZ HATAKANOT 867-
68 (1986).
" A ceiling of 35% was placed on the interest accrued on all zero-coupon
corporate bonds. Consequently, corporate issues were considered "preferred
loans," a status which eliminated taxation on nominal gains from linkage.
Previously, a company was required to receive explicit permission from the
Knesset Finance Committee; however, the Finance Committee reserved its
right to refuse the granting of the 35% tax ceiling. See Regulations to the
Encouragement of Savings Law of 1987, 5039 KoVETZ HATAKANOT 1047
(1987).
S See generally SECURITIES AUTHORITY, NEWSLETTER.
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This combination of largely uncoordinated piecemeal
measures (often referred to in Israel as "capital market
reform") had a major impact on Israel's financial markets
during the second half of the 1980's. This is especially true
with respect to the market for corporate bonds which barely
existed until the reform. 2 Yet, despite a significant reduc-
tion in governmental intervention, capital market reform did
not herald a qualitative change in regulatory thinking. Many
of the measures employed had traditionally been part of the
Finance Ministry's and Bank of Israel's arsenal; and their
usage often reflected adaptation to changing market conditions
rather than fundamental shifts in public policy.
However, more substantive advances in the regulatory
climate have occurred since 1987, spearheaded by the newly-
appointed Chairman of a reorganized Securities Authority. In
recent years, the Authority has become a more viable and
assertive regulatory agency, and has been instrumental in
enhancing professional standards and changing behavioral
norms. Major changes can be discerned in the following
areas:
83
- Examination of prospectuses and the enhancement of the
quality and timeliness of the flow of information.
- Establishment of corporate accounting standards.
- Enforcement of restrictions on insider trading and stock
price manipulation.
- Supervision of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.
- Promotion of new legislation.
6. NEw SECURITY MARKET LEGISLATION
The transformation of the Securities Authority also
triggered a major revision of Israel's securities legislation.
Amendment 9 to the Securities Law, 4 which was ratified in
32 In the early 1980's, the Ministry of Finance began to approve, on a
limited scale, corporate bond issues linked to the exchange rates of foreign
currencies. In 1984, the Knesset passed a law to encourage the issue of
"security packages," which included corporate bonds, to encourage research
and development. See Law for the Encouragement of Industrial Research
and Development of 1984, 38 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 130-45 (1983-
84). Approval of such issues was curtailed in 1986.
3 3See Sarnat & Dilevsky, supra note 24.
s, Securities Law, amend. IX, 1261 SEFER HAHoKIM 188-211 (1988).
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1988, altered most of the original articles in some way;
however, the underlying philosophy of full disclosure remained
intact. Amendment 9 increased the Securities Authority's
powers in selected areas. But for the most part, the amend-
ment, along with its subsequent secondary legislation, has
more clearly defined rather than changed the Authority's
regulatory powers vis-a-vis issuing firms, the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange,"5 and independent professionals involved in the
primary market. In addition, the amendment has extended
the legal accountability of the owners and managers of public
companies as well as independent professionals involved in the
primary market."
The 1988 amendment also introduced a standardized
framework for class action suits initiated by minority share-
holders for damages resulting from infringements of the
Securities Law or fiduciary duties."' Although existing
corporate legislation included remedies for minority grievances
against discriminatory "mismanagement,""s class actions, as
specified in the amended Securities law, was viewed as a way
to facilitate the process of civil litigation. The new law not
only specified the conditions under which class action is
possible, but also stipulated that in certain cases the Securi-
ties Authority can choose to participate in the financing of
class action suits."9
Other major changes introduced by Amendment 9 included:
- Trust indenture provisions requiring mandatory
appointment of an independent trustee by the issuers
3' Amendment XI, ratified at the close of 1990, further clarifies the areas
of authority granted the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. See Securities Law,
amend. XI, 1334 SEFER HAHoKIM 22-28 (1990).
s Amendment IX globalized responsibility of signatories of a prospectus
for the content of the entire document. See Securities Law, supra note 33,
§ 32. Amendment X, passed in 1990, tempered this responsibility as it
applies to independent professionals whose opinion appears in the
prospectus. See Securities Law, amend. X, 185 SEFER HAHOKIM 185-86
(1990).
s See Securities Law, supra note 33, §§ 54a-k.
8' Prior to Amendment IX, class action suits were possible, but plaintiffs
were not compensated for damages. In addition, under certain circumstanc-
es, minority shareholders may now sue management in the name of the
company via derivative suits.
S" See Securities Law, supra note 33, § 54g.
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of corporate bonds.40
- Provisions enabling the Securities Authority to set
accounting standards for the financial reporting of
public firms in instances where no recognized standards
exist.
41
- Provisions extending the liability of public issuers of
securities. This liability, which previously covered only
investors who purchased securities at issue, was
broadened to cover transactions in secondary mar-
kets.42
- Provisions to insure the independence of the Board of
Directors of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, including a
requirement that the Exchange's Board be comprised of
a majority of external directors. 3
Another major legislative change occurred at the end of 1990
with the ratification of Amendment 11.' A decision by the
Tel Aviv District Court 5 challenging the authority of the
Exchange to regulate the governance structure of listed firms
provided the catalyst for this amendment.4' The Court, in
this case, upheld the plaintiffs' claim regarding the limited
extent of the Exchange's authority, but the implications of the
decision extended beyond the specific Exchange directive
contested in court.
In 1989, the Stock Exchange issued a directive equalizing
the voting rights of listed firms. According to this directive,
new public corporations could issue only one class of shares,
and existing dual-class corporations could only issue the class
4. ld §§ 35a-p.
4'I. § 36a.
42 Id. at art. 31(a).
4' In order to qualify as an external director, a candidate cannot be
employed by a member of an Exchange and cannot serve a member of an
Exchange as a consultant on any regular basis. See id. § 45a.
44 See Securities Law, supra note 34, at 22-27.
"' Nimrodi Land Development, Ltd. and Hachsharat Hayishuv, Ltd. v.
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Ltd., 272 P.D. 89 (Tel Aviv District Court 1990)
(Israel).
4" The plaintiffs were arguing against a Stock Exchange directive
denying approval of a securities issue. The directive required that a
majority shareholder in possession of founders' shares which guarantee at
least 50% of the vote hold at least 25% of the capital of the firm. Id.
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with superior voting rights. Because the directive might be
construed as a failure to comply with the spirit of the above
ruling of the District Court, Amendment 11, which details and
limits the areas of Stock Exchange responsibility, explicitly
incorporated this directive into the Securities Law.
In addition to these changes in primary security legislation,
revisions to the secondary legislation under the Foreign
Currency Control Law have been made in an attempt to
gradually "re-liberalize" Israel's foreign currency regime."'
In 1989, foreign residents were extended the right to repatri-
ate investments made in corporate bonds issued by Israeli
firms" and Israeli mutual funds were granted permission to
invest in securities listed on foreign exchanges."9 In 1990,
Israeli companies were granted blanket permission to list
shares on recognized foreign exchanges (including the OTC
market in the United States). Additionally, Israeli residents
were permitted to invest in these shares. 0
The continuing dilemma between a regime based on free
market mechanisms and one permeated by governmental
intervention is also evident in legislation regarding corporate
mergers. In 1988, a new Restricted Trade Law" was passed
replacing earlier legislation designed to monitor the merger
activities of monopolies. The new law required the approval
of the Ministry of Industry and Trade for all mergers where
the combined assets of the merging parties exceed a minimal
7 In October 1977, some foreign currency controls were relaxed. Israelis
were permitted to hold foreign currency accounts in Israel as well as limited
sums abroad, to conduct local transactions in foreign currency, and to
purchase foreign securities. Similarly, foreign residents were permitted to
invest in both equity and non-equity instruments issued locally by Israeli
companies. However, between 1978-1984 restrictions on these activities
were gradually reintroduced. See ZEBULEN HANDLER & JOSEPH SHEFET,
THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN CURRENCY, vols. 1-3 (1991) (unofficial English
translation).
" See General Permit of the Foreign Currency Control Law, §§ 1, 11
(1978).
"' See hozrei hamefakeach al hamatbea chutz, nosach meshulav,
(Memoranda of the Controller of the Foreign Currency), ch. 6, at 4 (1989).
"' See General Permit of the Foreign Currency Control Law, supra note
47, § 5(7)(a). Before this change, a company had to receive special
permission to list shares or raise capital abroad. Moreover, special
permission was required before Israeli residents were allowed to invest in
these shares.
", Restricted Trade Law of 1988, 1258 SEFER HAHoKIM 128-40 (1988).
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amount (originally set at three million dollars). 2 And this
trend is not limited to mergers. Currently, legislation is
pending which addresses specific areas of the securities
industry, including provisions relating to mutual funds,
investment advice and portfolio management. These provi-
sions, if adopted, would increase the Ministry of Finance's
discretion over market operations."s
7. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
During the past decade, many significant legislative
decisions and administrative steps have been taken with a
view to reforming Israel's capital markets. Despite the many
changes in the regulatory environment, the basic conflict
between the two competing philosophies of public regulation
remains unresolved. In the absence of a more fundamental
change in the underlying philosophy governing capital market
regulation, some doubt arises with respect to the permanence
of the reforms, especially if the need to fund a large govern-
ment budgetary deficit should arise.
Many of the new "reform measures" are not qualitatively
different from similar steps adopted in the past to encourage
domestic and/or foreign investment. The suspension of the
requirement of Treasury approval of new security issues, the
relaxation of the mandatory investment requirements imposed
on institutional investors, and the changes in foreign currency
regulations have all been adopted, at one time or another in
the past, and later rescinded. Moreover, despite the major
revisions that had been made in the Securities Law, the
Ministry of Finance's authority to reimpose controls over the
supply of capital, as provided in Article 39 of the Securities
Law, remains intact.
Israel's 1983 financial crisis reflected a failure to enforce
62 Id. § 4.
" See Law for the Regulation of Investment Advisors and Portfolio
Managers, 1857 HATZAAT HOK [Knesset Bill) 29-46 (1987); Joint Investment
Trust Law, TAZKIR HOK (proposed Nov. 4, 1990). The proposed laws provide
the legal framework for regulation of investment advisory services and
mutual fund management. Both laws restrict the daily operations of
brokers and mutual fund managers in various ways and both grant the
Minister of Finance discretionary powers in areas such as the determination
of brokerage commissions and the composition of mutual funds.
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existing laws; it was the "spirit" of the law, and not the law
itself, that was missing."" Massive governmental interven-
tion did not prevent, and arguably was one of the causes of,
the collapse of the financial system. Recognition of this aspect
of the crisis reinforces the argument that legislation, public
regulation, and direct governmental intervention should be
limited to the minimum necessary to provide an appropriate
framework and suitable environment for the efficient function-
ing of a free market. Beyond that, Israel must confront the
fundamental paradox inherent in basing its regulatory
framework on a "two-edged sword," and learn to depend on
market forces to provide the guidelines for future investment
and financing decisions.
54 COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY REPORT, supra note 20, at 348-49.
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